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 In this chapter, I review recent work on neuroscientifi c threats to free will. What is it 
for something to threaten free will? Consider, fi rst, an  apparent threat. You are walking 
in the dark, and a shadow looms in the distance. It certainly appears threatening, but 
you are not sure. What do you do? You consider the source of the threat (the thing 
casting the shadow, and you attempt to discover whether the threat is  actual (an 
attacker) or  merely apparent (a tree). And if the threat is actual, you attempt to discern 
what epistemic and behavioral changes are required of you. 
 It is clear that recent work in neuroscience—along with recent work in psychology 
(for which see Miller:  Chapter 36 , this volume)—represents at least an apparent threat. 
This is why the issue has received so much attention in the popular press, and in the 
scientifi c and philosophical literatures. What we are now trying to do is discern whether 
the threat is actual or merely apparent. If it is actual, then we will have to consider what 
epistemic and behavioral changes are required of us. If it is merely apparent, then we 
can go on our way. 
 Two questions will guide my discussion below. First, does  current neuroscience pres-
ent an actual threat? This involves consideration of the main neuroscientifi c results 
taken to threaten free will. I do this in the next two sections, “Seemingly Threatening 
Results,” and “Do These Studies Actually Threaten Free Will?” Second, how does (or 
might) neuroscience threaten free will? This involves consideration of the source and 
nature of the apparent threat. Importantly, even if current neuroscience presents no 
threat, future neuroscience might. Understanding the nature of the apparent threat 
ought to help us as we look for emerging threats in the near future. In “How Might 
Neuroscience Threaten Free Will?” I consider recent work that is relevant to this 
question. 
 Seemingly Threatening Results 
 Amongst the seemingly threatening results, the most widely publicized stem from the 
work of Benjamin Libet and colleagues (see Libet et al. 1983). Libet had participants 
decide to fl ex a wrist while watching a clock and paying attention to the moment they 
felt an urge to fl ex. At the same time, Libet monitored electrical activity in the brains 
of participants. On average, participants reported feeling the urge to fl ex about 
200 milliseconds before they began fl exing. This is not that interesting. What was inter-
esting was something happening in participants’ brains before they felt the urge. 
At about 550 milliseconds before participants began fl exing, electrical activity  associated 
with voluntary action preparation began to emerge (more specifi cally, this is a negative 
shift in the so-called readiness potential, or RP). According to Libet and other interpret-
ers of this experiment, it looked like this: there was a space of roughly 350 milliseconds 
during which participants sat watching a clock, while (unbeknownst to them) the brain 
had either already decided what to do, or was preparing the decision about what to do. 
Here is how Libet et al. (1983) put it in their seminal paper: 
 Since onset of RP regularly begins at least several hundreds of milliseconds 
before the appearance of a reportable time for awareness of any subjective 
intention or wish to act, it would appear that some neuronal activity associated 
with the eventual performance of the act has started well before any (recall-
able) conscious initiation or intervention could be possible. Put another way, 
the brain evidently ‘decides’ to initiate or, at the least, prepare to initiate the 
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act at a time before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a 
decision has taken place. 
 (Libet et al. 1983: 640) 
 Recent work in the Libet tradition has further pressed this line of reasoning by  uncovering 
evidence that in certain experimental conditions, a participant’s decision can be pre-
dicted—to a level above chance—several seconds before the decision is made.  Consider, 
for example, a recent study by Chun Siong Soon and colleagues (Soon et al. 2013). In 
this study, participants sat watching a computer screen that displayed changing letters 
and numbers. Participants were instructed to spontaneously decide whether to add or 
subtract the passing numbers, and to memorize the letter present when they made this 
decision. This allowed the experimenters to locate the time of the decision. 
 Using sophisticated statistical techniques, Soon et al. (2013) were able to decode 
signals in various regions of the brain that contained predictive information about the 
upcoming choice. More specifi cally, up to four seconds before the decision, signals in the 
medial frontopolar region of the brain predicted the upcoming decision with 59.5 percent 
accuracy, and signals in the precuneus and posterior cingulate predicted the upcoming 
decision with 59 percent accuracy. 
 I turn now to a different line of evidence. It is often taken to bolster the Libet-type 
results, and to pose a further threat to free will. Since the line of evidence actually 
encompasses work in both neuroscience and psychology, I will review one study from 
psychology, before returning to neuroscience. In this study, Daniel Wegner and Thalia 
Wheatley (1999) had participants sit opposite another person at a table, facing a 
wooden square which sat on top of a computer mouse. The other person was in fact in 
collaboration with Wegner and Wheatley. In the study, both people attempted to jointly 
move the wooden square. As they did so, they watched a cursor on a screen that 
 contained many different objects. Participants were instructed to stop the cursor 
 periodically. Now for a complication: participants wore headphones which played music 
and words. Participants were told that the words were random distracters, and that the 
music indicated when they were to stop the cursor. In reality, however, the words would 
prime the participants by naming objects on the screen. 
 The movements made by both the participants and the other person (the Wegner and 
Wheatley collaborator) occurred in two conditions. In one condition, the collaborator 
would surreptitiously bring the cursor to a stop at a certain object on the screen. In a 
second condition, the collaborator would not do this, thus allowing the participant to 
bring the cursor to a stop at a certain object on the screen. After this, participants 
offered a rating concerning what had just happened. The rating was on a 0 to 100 scale, 
with 0 indicating ‘I allowed the stop to happen’ and 100 indicating ‘I intended to make 
the stop.’ When the collaborator did nothing, the average participant rating was 56. 
When the collaborator surreptitiously brought the cursor to a stop, the average rating 
depended signifi cantly on the words they were hearing through the headphones. If, 
30 seconds before the stop, participants heard a word that matched where the cursor 
came to a stop, their average rating was 44. But if 5 seconds before the stop, partici-
pants heard a word that matched where the cursor came to a stop, their average rating 
was 60. This difference of 16 points on the scale is statistically signifi cant. Wegner and 
Wheatley concluded that “the experience of will can be created by manipulation of 
thought and action . . . and this experience can occur even when the person’s thought 
cannot have created the action” (1999: 489). 
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 A very different study—this one from neuroscience—might seem to have the same 
moral. In this study, Joaquim Brasil-Neto and colleagues (1992) told participants to 
decide whether to move their right or left index fi nger after hearing a click. The machine 
responsible for the click either did or did not direct transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) to prefrontal or motor cortex. Interestingly, when TMS was applied to motor 
cortex, a certain portion of participants (80 percent of those who moved within 200 ms 
of the click) decided to move the fi nger corresponding to the place in motor cortex that 
received TMS. However, according to Brasil-Neto et al., participants reported no 
awareness of the effect of the TMS. However, those who moved more than 200 ms after 
the click showed no bias for that fi nger. Interpreting this result, Brasil-Neto et al. write 
“it is possible to infl uence movement preparation processes externally without disrupting 
the conscious perception of volition . . . [our results] suggest that conscious perception 
of willing a particular action is preceded, and possibly generated, by cerebral processes 
that can be infl uenced by magnetic stimulation” (1992: 966). 
 These studies are central examples of the body of evidence often taken to threaten 
free will. Regarding this threat, at least two things deserve attention. First, although 
there are important differences between these studies, with respect to the purported 
threat to free will—and seen from a certain height—these studies all tell a similar story. 
The story is this: with respect to intentional action, and decision-making, how things 
seem is not how things are. While it seems to most of us as though the conscious mind 
is in control of deliberation and decision, these studies suggest that this is incorrect. The 
studies in the Libet tradition suggest that the brain, rather than the conscious mind, 
takes care of all the signifi cant work in decision-making. The conscious mind, so goes 
the suggestion, is passive and ineffi cacious, awaiting the result of the brain’s work. This 
suggestion receives support from work in the Wegner tradition—work that suggests that 
the conscious experience of intentional action is in some sense misleading. In “Do 
These Studies Actually Threaten Free Will?” I review criticisms of these studies. 
 Second, these studies are not directly about free will. They are about the mechanisms 
that undergird decision-making, intentional action, and the conscious experience of 
decision-making and intentional action. So to understand the nature of the threat to 
free will these studies represent, we need to understand how decision-making, inten-
tional action, and the conscious experience of decision-making and intentional action 
relate to free will. In other words, philosophical work is required in order to determine 
whether the threat is actual or merely apparent. In “How Might Neuroscience Threaten 
Free Will?” I review recent work in this connection. 
 Do These Studies Actually Threaten Free Will? 
 Philosophers—and increasingly, scientists—have criticized the threatening studies in a 
number of ways (for a recent exception, see Caruso 2012). The literature is too big to 
review in detail: here I restrict attention to the studies reviewed above. Let us begin by 
considering studies in the Wegner tradition. These are studies that suggest that the 
conscious experience of intentional action is in some sense misleading. As Wegner has 
famously argued, “unconscious and inscrutable mechanisms create both conscious 
thought about action and the action, and also produce the sense of will we experience 
by perceiving the thought as cause of the action” (2002: 98). 
 But do the studies reviewed above offer support to this claim? A number of philosophers 
(e.g., Nahmias 2002; Bayne 2006) have noted that Wegner’s claim seems to depend on 
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a kind of inductive generalization: a move from the discovery that some conscious expe-
riences of action are misleading to the claim that all (or most) conscious experiences of 
action are misleading. But this is problematic: that some experiences are misleading 
does not license the claim that the mechanisms responsible for these experiences are 
systematically misleading: much more evidence is needed to establish a claim like that 
(see Bayne 2006: 179, 180). Indeed, much subsequent work into the mechanisms 
responsible for generating (or the mechanisms that simply subserve) experiences of 
action indicates that they are quite reliable. The mechanisms responsible for our expe-
riences of agency, while imperfect indicators of agency, appear to be closely related to 
the mechanisms responsible for initiating and controlling action (see Pacherie 2008, 
Synofzik et al. 2008). This at least suggests—without proving, of course—that our expe-
riences of acting, deciding, and the like, are not  systematically misleading (for more 
discussion of this point, see “Free Will and the Phenomenology of Agency,”  Chapter 56 , 
this volume; Shepherd 2016). 
 Further, many have raised more specifi c problems with the central studies. I will focus 
on the Wegner and Wheatley study reviewed above (for discussion of the Brasil-Neto 
et al. (1992) study, see Shepherd 2013). Recall Wegner and Wheatley’s interpretation of 
that study: “the experience of will can be created by manipulation of thought and 
action . . . and this experience can occur even when the person’s thought cannot have 
created the action” (1999: 489). Recall that on a 0 to 100 scale, participants offered 
ratings in the mid-50s where 100 represented ‘I intended to make the stop.’ Notice that 
this statement says nothing about the experience of will: it is about the existence of an 
intention. But even putting that complication aside, Joshua Shepherd (2013) has noted 
that “the rating of 56% indicates a degree of confusion about what, if anything, was 
decided,” and further, that we do not know how participants interpreted the scale. 
Given this, it is plausible that participants “simply felt that the action occurred thanks 
in part to their participation,” (Shepherd 2013: 24) rather than that the action occurred 
because of some experience of will on their part. Given their actual data, Wegner and 
Wheatley’s claim appears far too strong. (The same criticism applies to interpretations 
of a similar experiment given in Wegner et al. [2004].) 
 I turn to studies in the Libet tradition. The literature discussing these studies is large. 
But most agree that the most sophisticated treatment of these studies and their relevance 
for free will is Alfred Mele’s (2009) book  Effective Intentions (see also Bayne 2011 for an 
excellent discussion). In meticulous detail, Mele argues for the following claims (among 
others). First, it is doubtful that Libet-style studies show that the brain decides before 
the conscious mind is aware of the decision. Instead, these studies at best offer evidence 
of early nonconscious preparation for decision, which is compatible with the decision 
being made consciously. Second, Libet-style studies do not rule out the possibility that 
conscious intentions cause the relevant behavior—the wrist-fl exing. Although it is 
sometimes asserted that Libet-style studies show intentions emerge ‘too late’ to do any 
causal work, Mele reviews work on reaction times that indicates Libet’s data in fact 
leave enough time for participants in these studies to acquire intentions to fl ex and for 
these intentions to initiate the fl exing. Third, since Libet-style studies involve simple 
actions such as the fl exing of a wrist, it is unclear whether the data they generate 
speak to the kinds of decisions that matter— decisions that involve the weighing of 
reasons for and against action (for more on this point, see Roskies 2010). Indeed, 
Mele notes it is relatively unsurprising that we are not aware of what produces simple 
movements such as wrist-fl exings. What would be surprising is a lack of awareness 
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regarding our reasons for action in decisions that matter (for discussion of some rele-
vant data on this point, see Miller:  Chapter 36 , this volume). Mele writes, “If we never 
had any more insight into why we decided as we did than [do participants in Libet-style 
experiments] . . . we would be much more mysterious to ourselves than we actually are” 
(2009: 87). 
 Since the publication of Mele’s book, emerging neuroscience has, if anything, 
trended in a free will-friendly direction. It looks, for example, like the Libet-style results 
do not generalize to decisions that matter. Susan Pockett and Suzanne C. Purdy review 
evidence that “RPs often do not occur at all before movements initiated as a result of 
decisions, as opposed to spontaneous urges” (2010: 34). And without any relevant RP 
pattern, there is little reason to think that the processes responsible for felt urges and 
wrist-fl exes in Libet-style studies are also responsible for decisions and the experience of 
decision-making in other contexts. 
 Further, neuroscientists Aaron Schurger, Jacobo D. Sitt, and Stanislas Dehaene 
(2012) offer data supporting the view that the Readiness Potential—the signal often 
interpreted as the brain deciding or preparing to decide what to do—does not refl ect 
anything like a decision. Instead, the Readiness Potential might refl ect little more than 
neural noise—the kind of gradual increase in neural activity that precedes many spon-
taneous movements, but is not present in all cases of intentional movements. Schurger 
et al. (2012) summarize as follows: 
 We suggest reserving the term ‘decision’ to the commitment to move achieved 
once neural activity (spontaneous or goal directed) crosses a specifi c threshold 
. . . The reason we do not experience the urge to move as having happened 
earlier than about 200 ms before movement onset is simply because, at that 
time, the neural decision to move (crossing the decision threshold) had not 
yet been made. A very similar fl uctuation in neuronal fi ring could equally 
well, at some other time, have not preceded the movement . . . We propose 
that the  neural decision to move coincides in time with average subjective 
estimates of the time of awareness of intention to move and that the brain 
produces a reasonably accurate estimate of the time of its movement-causing 
decision events. 
 (Schurger et al. 2012: E2910) 
 This looks pretty devastating to anti-free will interpretations of the Libet data. Notice, 
though, that Schurger et al. (2012) continue to speak of what happens at 200 ms before 
a wrist fl ex as a “neural decision.” But recent work indicates it is not even that.  Han-Gue 
Jo and colleagues (Jo et al. 2013) had an expert meditator go through a Libet-style 
experiment. In one condition they asked the participant to notice when an urge to fl ex 
appeared in consciousness, and then to wait for as long as possible before fl exing. When 
this was done, the RP showed a similar pattern before the urge appeared, but crucially, 
the RP did not immediately cause the wrist fl exing. Instead, the participant waited for 
up to 3 seconds before fl exing. It is plausible, then, that the RP refl ects neural preparation 
not for a decision, but for the appearance of an urge to move in consciousness—an urge 
that at least some participants are free to follow or reject. 
 The proper conclusion, then, is that current neuroscience does not present an actual 
threat to free will. Even so, everyone should acknowledge that the science of agency is 
far from complete. It remains possible that future neuroscience will offer an actual 
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threat to free will. As such, it is important to refl ect on why current neuroscience is 
often taken to offer such a threat. This kind of refl ection might help us see the kinds of 
results that may, in the future, actually threaten free will. 
 How Might Neuroscience Threaten Free Will? 
 Surveying recent work related to this question, at least four answers emerge. I will take 
them one at a time. 
 First, neuroscience might threaten free will if work in neuroscience is able to show 
that the brain is deterministic. Now, whether determinism is a threat depends on what 
conditions turn out to be required for the possession of free will. Compatibilists main-
tain that free will is compatible with the truth of determinism. So if neuroscientists 
were to show that the brain—and especially the processes responsible for deliberation 
and decision-making—operated according to deterministic causal laws, only libertarians 
about free will would fi nd this threatening. 
 However, neuroscience is unlikely to show any such thing. Adina Roskies observes 
that since “we have no objective access to either determinism or indeterminism” the 
best we can do is to operationalize determinism as predictability (Roskies 2014: 105). 
Given this limitation, we are unlikely to discover compelling evidence for indeterminism – 
deterministic systems can display stochastic, and thus seemingly indeterministic, 
 behavior (although see Tse [2013] for an argument that the brain is an indeterministic 
system, and that this is crucial for our free will). But does this preclude us fi nding 
 compelling evidence for determinism? Roskies asks us to imagine that we acquire full 
information about some area in the brain that subserves decision-making, such that “we 
could with perfect accuracy predict the subsequent behavior of the agent” (2014: 116). 
This might offer some inductive evidence in favor of determinism. But since any given 
brain area—and indeed, the brain itself—is an open causal system, it is always possible 
that an event  somewhere else infl uences the operation of the system in question, render-
ing the process indeterministic. We might someday revise current physical theory in 
favor of determinism—but that will result from advances in theoretical physics, not 
advances in neuroscience. 
 Second, neuroscience might threaten free will if work in neuroscience is able to show 
that naturalism about the mental—the claim that minds operate entirely according to 
natural laws, and thus that there is no place for souls or otherwise non-natural sub-
stances in our understanding of agency—is true. As with determinism, whether 
 naturalism about the mental threatens free will depends on what conditions turn out to 
be required for the possession of free will. Naturalism is threatening only if free will 
requires the operation of souls or otherwise non-natural substances. 
 There is evidence that some people understand free will in this way (Nadelhoffer et al. 
2014). But there is evidence that some people do not understand free will in this way 
as well (Mele 2014). For all we currently know, evidence in favor of naturalism about 
the mental would threaten some people’s understanding of free will. At this point one 
is tempted to ask: what about free will itself? Does free will  really require non-naturalism 
about the mental? One’s answer to this question will depend on one’s view about a 
range of controversial views in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the philoso-
phy of action. Although most living philosophers—this one included—are naturalists 
about the mental, there remain many who disagree. This is not the place to settle dis-
putes on this issue. But it is worth noting that even if neuroscience could demonstrate 
JOSHUA SHEPHERD
8
the truth of naturalism about the mental, serious philosophical work would be required 
to  determine whether this presented an actual as opposed to a merely apparent threat to 
free will. 
 It is, of course, dubious that neuroscience could  prove the truth of a metaphysical 
thesis like naturalism. But neuroscience might, as Eddy Nahmias argues, render naturalism 
more plausible “by providing increasingly complete explanations for observable events 
in the universe, including human behavior, in terms of natural processes and laws” 
(2014: 8, 9). It is thus plausible, then, that if free will requires non-naturalism about the 
mental, then neuroscience (with science generally) represents a threat to free will, one 
that non-naturalists about free will should be motivated to confront. 
 Third, neuroscience might threaten free will if work in neuroscience is able to show 
that talk of mental states and mental causes of action is eliminable—if the best expla-
nation of human agency need refer only to causal processes at the neurobiological 
level. According to this possibility, neuroscience is showing (or will one-day show) 
that the best explanation of human agency need make no reference to intentions, 
decisions, and the like. Here is how the neuroscientist William T. Newsome articulates 
this possibility. 
 The critical question is whether our beliefs, values, and aspirations . . . are 
real entities with real causal effi cacy in the world or whether they are illusory 
 constructs that we make up to describe our experience of a world whose 
causal determinants lie at a much more fundamental level. Many neurosci-
entists appear to subscribe to the latter point of view, leading to skepticism 
about our own ability to control our actions and effect change in the world. 
This conviction seems to be driven by a reductionist methodology (and ide-
ology!) that is  eliminative in the sense that it seeks to replace high-level con-
structs and processes with lower level explanations where  fundamental truth 
is thought to lie. 
 (Newsome 2014: 93) 
 And here is Francis Crick endorsing the possibility as fact: “your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will are in fact no more than the 
behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” (1994: 3). 
 Now, most philosophers agree that if this kind of ruthlessly reductionist eliminativism 
were correct, free will would be under dire threat. But it is important to note that many 
philosophers, as well as many scientists, fi nd nothing in current neuroscience that warrants 
this kind of eliminativism. 
 Newsome does a nice job of summarizing the reasons why. First, positing mental 
states such as beliefs, desires and intentions continues to give us extraordinary predic-
tive power regarding human behavior—a predictive power neuroscience cannot, at 
present, match. Second, treating human agents as systems driven by mental states con-
tinues to give us extraordinary manipulative power regarding human behavior—a 
manipulative power neuroscience cannot, at present, match. Third, a theory that posits 
behaviorally relevant mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions is much more 
parsimonious than a theory that attempts to explain all behavior by reference to the 
interactions between the environment and the nervous system. 
 Although it might turn out to be true that the best explanation of human agency is 
eliminativist, at present, we have little reason to think this is so. However, neuroscience 
NEUROSCIENTIFIC THREATS TO FREE WILL
9
is young. It is possible that as knowledge about the brain increases, our folk psycho-
logical categories will come to seem less and less useful as explanatory constructs. If so, 
we will have to refi ne or eliminate these categories. But it is diffi cult to predict whether 
the growth of knowledge will constitute a threat to free will, or whether this growth will 
simply refi ne our understanding of how free will works. Even so, for those on the  lookout 
for threats to free will, the eliminativist threat is something to keep in mind as neuro-
science progresses. 
 Fourth, neuroscience might threaten free will if work in neuroscience is able to show 
that modular epiphenomenalism is true. Modular epiphenomenalism is, according to 
Eddy Nahmias, the view that “those modules involved in conscious decisions or 
 intention formation do not produce our behavior; rather other modules or processes 
that involve no conscious states produce our behavior” (2014: 12). This looks like 
something that neuroscience might be able to confi rm or disconfi rm. Indeed, early indi-
cations such as those reviewed in the last section are that modular epiphenomenalism 
is false. But suppose we were to discover that it is true (at least sometimes). Would we 
thereby have discovered an actual threat to free will? 
 I can see at least two reasons to think that the answer is yes. The fi rst stems from 
epistemic considerations. If modular epiphenomenalism is true, then the way things 
seem to us regarding decision-making is not the way that things are. While it seems like 
our deliberation is effective, and while it seems like we often consciously decide for 
reasons, in fact, the processes that produce our decisions and actions are opaque to us. 
This raises a problem about how well we understand what we are doing when we are 
acting. Perhaps we are often wrong about the considerations driving our intention 
acquisition and our subsequent action. If so, we might have reason to worry about 
whether such systematic illusion about the sources of our action is consistent with our 
actions being free. David Rosenthal suggests something like this thought in the follow-
ing  passage: “Acting freely consists not in our volitions being uncaused, but in those 
volitions fi tting comfortably within a conscious picture we have of ourselves and of the 
kinds of things we characteristically want and do” (2002: 219). Plausibly, free will—
especially the kind of free will required for attributions of moral responsibility—requires 
a lack of ignorance about what one is doing (Zimmerman 1997). Insofar as modular 
epiphenomenalism suggests that agents are often ignorant of why they decide as they 
do, modular epiphenomenalism will threaten free will. 
 A second reason modular epiphenomenalism might constitute an actual threat to 
free will has to do with consciousness. It is a widely held intuition that consciousness is 
somehow very important for free will (see, e.g., Shepherd 2012). Some philosophers 
appear to think consciousness is necessary (in some way) for free will. So, for example, 
Robert Kane has recently claimed that 
 if conscious will were an illusion or epiphenomenalism or eliminative reduc-
tionism were true, all theories of freedom and responsibility would be threatened, 
compatibilist and libertarian alike, since they all require, to some degree at 
least, causally effi cacious conscious mental processes. 
 (2014: 129) 
 Gregg Caruso agrees, asserting that “Our folk psychological theory [of free will] requires 
not only mental causation but conscious will!  (2012: 212).  And Ted Honderich has 
recently claimed that “The subject of freedom and responsibility has never been 
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separable from the subject of consciousness . . . there is no question at all of freedom and 
responsibility with respect to what is unconscious”  (2013: 60). 
 Interestingly, however, not everyone shares this intuition. The neurologist Mark 
 Hallett, for example, asks whether the purported ineffi cacy of conscious will actually 
threatens free will, and answers as follows. “Since ‘I’ am my brain, it is not necessary to 
ask this question only in relation to what is conscious. It is possible to say that a brain 
is free if the brain can function without external constraint” (Hallett 2013: 262). The 
philosopher Sven Walter rejects the importance of consciousness: “why should anyone 
accept that decisions and actions can be free only if they have been caused  by the feeling 
of having consciously willed them ? . . . There are neither theoretical reasons for such a 
conception of free will, nor do there seem to be any pre-theoretic intuitions that 
 mandate it” (Walter 2014: 18). And David Rosenthal downplays the difference between 
conscious and nonconscious mental states: 
 it is plain that there is no difference in respect of freedom between conscious 
and nonconscious volitions. In both cases volitions result from various anteced-
ent mental occurrences of which we are largely unaware. Conscious volitions 
differ from those which are not conscious only in that we are conscious of 
them. 
 (2002: 219) 
 Which side is right? Answering this question will require an increase in attention to 
the relationships between consciousness, decision-making and intentional action 
(see “Free Will and the Phenomenology of Agency,”  Chapter 56 , this volume; Levy: 
 Chapter 38 , this volume), as well as an increase in attention to the relationships 
between consciousness and free will. What about consciousness makes it important for 
free will, if it is? Recent work in the philosophy of action has begun to examine this 
question (see, e.g., Hodgson 2012; Tse 2013; Levy 2014). We might hope that progress 
in this area will substantially clarify the nature of the threat to free will presented by 
modular epiphenomenalism. 
 Conclusion 
 As we have seen, a range of results in neuroscience present an apparent threat to free 
will. These are results that suggest that with respect to decision-making and intentional 
action, how things seem is not how they are. I have reviewed a number of criticisms of 
the relevant neuroscience, however, and have suggested that the threat presented by 
current neuroscience is not actual, but merely apparent. Even so, given the relative 
youth of neuroscience, we can expect that advances in our knowledge of the brain will 
continue to present apparent threats to free will. Determining whether these apparent 
threats are actual threats—and if so, determining the epistemic and behavioral changes 
they require—will require continued attention to the neuroscientifi c details as well as 
to the philosophical issues raised by the details. 
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